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Abstract
We study a unidimensional model of spatial competition between
two parties with two types of politicians. The oﬃce oriented politicians,
referred to as “opportunist” politicians, care only about the spoils of
the oﬃce. The policy oriented politicians, referred to as “militant”
politicians have ideological preferences on the policy space. In this
framework, we compare a winner-take-all system, where all the spoils
go to the winner, to a proportional system, where the spoils of oﬃce are
split among the two parties proportionally to their share of the vote.
We study the existence of short term political equilibria and then,
within an evolutionary setup, the dynamics and stability of policies
and of party membership decisions.
1 Introduction
In this paper we use a classical model of electoral competition to study the
evolution of party membership. The citizens choose the government in the
elections and thereby the policy to be implemented. The parties compete by
oﬀering policies and make credible commitments to implement these poli-
cies in case they are elected. The preferences of voters and the political
competition together determine the collective outcome and the membership
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decisions of opportunist politicians are driven by the prospects of being
elected. A main feature of political parties is that they are composed of fac-
tions who diﬀer in their political motivations: one faction is an oﬃce seeker
while the other faction cares about the ideological platform of the party. The
former will be referred to as the opportunist faction and the latter will be
referred to as the militant faction, following Roemer (1999). The previous
formal analysis about political competition suppose that there are oppor-
tunist politicians in each party competing in the elections, but we need to
answer why the opportunist politicians, who care only about the prospects
of winning the elections and holding an oﬃce, choose to be in one party
rather than the other or whether there should be opportunist politicians in
each party. This paper attempts to answer these questions by treating the
membership decision of a politician to a party as a strategic choice and by
introducing an evolutionary setup. While the membership decisions of op-
portunist politicians is analysed within an evolutionary setup, the political
outcome is identically to previous formal analysis given by the equilibrium of
the simultaneous move electoral competition. This context allows us to view
the political competition as a dynamic process and provides an explanation
to the dynamic aspect of the political competition.
1.1 Related literature
The political interpretation of spatial models of competition dates back to
the famous discussion of duopolists by Hotelling (1929). Hotelling formu-
lated the tendency of competitors to be exactly alike under the principle
of minimum diﬀerentiation and suggested that this principle can be applied
to a wide range of social phenomena including the political competition,
referring to the ideological similarities between the Republican and the De-
mocratic platforms in the elections of 1928. This intuition was later formu-
lated as “the median voter theorem” by Black (1948) in the case voters were
characterised by single peaked preferences.
Downs (1957) extended the spatial model of competition to represen-
tative democracy where two candidates competed by oﬀering policies from
a unidimensional policy space. Under the Downsian approach the politi-
cal parties are considered to be organised for the purpose of winning the
elections, therefore the policy makers are supposed to shape their policy
proposals in order to please the majority. In this sense the competitors are
identical in all respects and the common equilibrium policy proposal is found
at the preferred policy of the median citizen.
Along with this oversimplified view of the politicians as vote maximisers,
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there has been a long tradition from Michels (1915) to Lipset (1959) in
which parties are ideological and they have policy preferences. This idea
has later been formalised by Wittman (1983), Calvert (1985) and Hansson
and Stuart (1984) who characterised parties as institutions that represent
contesting interest groups in the society. Thus the competing candidates
become diﬀerentiated as each represents an interest group in the society
and seeks publicity for a diﬀerent ideological platform. These politicians are
supposed to have preferences over the policy space and to propose policies
accordingly with the essential feature that parties and their ideologies are
exogenously given.
These two approaches have been combined by Roemer (1999) who con-
ceptualised parties as consisting of an opportunist faction and a militant
faction1. Opportunists are those who wish to maximise the probability of
victory, and militants are those who want to maximise the utility of the
citizen the party represents. The opportunists belong to Downs’s (1957)
conception of politics and the militants to Wittman’s (1983) conception of
politics. In this context, a party-unanimity Nash equilibrium (PUNE) is
defined. This consists of policies which are in equilibrium in the following
sense: in neither party can the (internal) factions agree on a deviation from
the proposed policy, given the other party’s policy proposal.
1.2 Outline of the model
This paper adopts the previous approach but adds a dynamic dimension.
Roemer (1999) studies a static model where there is a fixed number of op-
portunist politicians in each party. Here, we will suppose that this number
is fixed in the short term but can evolve in the long run. The opportunist
politicians are supposed to review their membership decisions in the pre-
election period according to evolutionary dynamics. Moreover a technical
diﬀerence from the previous analysis is that Roemer (1999) adopted a de-
cision rule where each faction in the party has veto power over the policy
proposals. Here, the internal decision mechanism is simply taken to be a
weighted average of proposals of diﬀerent factions2.
More precisely, we consider the following electoral cycle:
1 In Roemer (1999), there is a third faction, the so-called reformists, who maximise
the expected utility of party constituents. We do not include the reformist faction in our
model.
2 In Roemer (2001), it has been also shown that when each party works out a method
of inner-party bargaining, the policy proposal that they reach as a consequence of inner-
party bargaining is a PUNE since at that proposal, no parties’ factions would agree to
deviate to another policy.
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1. Given the party membership profiles each party announces the party
platform which is obtained by the aggregation of the policy propos-
als of the factions. The aggregation rule is the weighted average of
the policy proposals of each faction. The influence of each faction is
proportional to its weight in the party. The proposal of the militant
faction is given exogenously. The proposal of the opportunist faction
is obtained through the maximisation of their utilities given the policy
proposal of the competing party. However, the opportunists are sup-
posed to be subject to a certain constraint in their decision making
processes. The opportunist faction of the party L (R) can not pro-
pose a platform greater (less) than the platform of the party R (L).
This is taken as an assumption but could be rationalized in several
ways. For instance, one can think that, in the process of choosing the
party platform, a politician would be expelled from the party if he was
to propose a platform “of the opposite side”, precisely for party L a
platform at the right of party R platform.
2. The political outcome is determined by the elections. We consider two
political systems diﬀering in the way that votes are translated into
seats in an assembly: the proportional system and the winner-take-all
system. These two systems diﬀer by the rewards that accrue to vote
shares. In the winner-take-all system, all the spoils of oﬃce go to the
winner. In the proportional system, the spoils of oﬃce are split among
the candidates proportionally to their share of the vote. The spoils of
oﬃce represent the benefits for a party of being able to implement its
policy, and the rents from power.
3. Between elections, the opportunist candidates review their member-
ship decisions to the political parties for the following elections. The
standard approach is to assume that the rational and optimising politi-
cians can collectively locate the equilibrium of the model and then to
compute the equilibria of the two stage game where the opportunists
review their membership decisions at the first stage and the parties
make their policy proposals at the second stage3. This approach will
not provide insight about the evolution of the behaviour of oppor-
tunist candidates from any initial state. As we attempt to study the
disequilibrium dynamics, we will suppose that initially there are op-
portunist politicians in each party. The proportion of candidates in
each party will then evolve based upon the standard replicator dynam-
3The formal results are provided in Appendix.
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ics. This rule essentially means that opportunists candidates tend to
enroll preferably into the party that oﬀers them better perspectives.
The militants by definition are not supposed to review their member-
ship decisions4.
1.3 Results
We analyse the behaviour of the opportunist politicians under the propor-
tional and the winner-take-all systems. There are two kinds of states of
the opportunist population: the pure states where all the opportunists are
in one party or the other and the mixed states where the opportunists are
distributed in both parties. The pure states are rest points of evolutionary
dynamics in both systems. We show that, in the winner-take-all system,
one only one mixed state is a rest point of the dynamics. In the propor-
tional system, depending on the distribution of voters and the distribution
of politicians, there may be zero, one, or more mixed state rest points. In
the winner-take-all system, only the pure states are stable regardless of the
distribution of the voters. The mixed state is not stable. In the proportional
system, the stability of the pure and mixed states depend on the distribution
of voters and the distribution of politicians. Only in this case can there be
stable mixed states.
The paper is organised as follows. In the next section the political eco-
nomic environment is formulated. Section 3 describes the aggregation of pol-
icy proposals of diﬀerent factions within each party and provides the short
term equilibrium results. Section 4 introduces the evolutionary process used
to analyse the behaviour of opportunist politicians and gives the long run
stability results. Section 5 concludes with a discussion of the results.
2 The model
2.1 The voters
A society has to decide collectively on a policy t such as a redistributive
income tax levied by the government in order to finance a public good that
is equally valued by all citizens. The policy space is the unit interval. Each
citizen evaluates the policies according to their utility and uses the only one
4Other behavioral models of dynamic political competiton use the techniques of agent-
based modeling (Kollman, Miller and Page 1992; Kollman, Miller and Page 1998; De
Marchi 1999; Kollman, Miller and Page 2003; Laver 2005).
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vote he has for the policy he likes best. Each voter has well-defined single-
peaked political preferences given by an ideological position. The voters
are distributed according to their ideal policies on the unit interval by a
cumulative distribution function F , so that F (t) = Pr(T ≤ t) where T is
a random variable describing the voters’ ideal policies. The average ideal
policy is
_
t =
1Z
0
tdF (t) (1)
and the median voter is given by
t∗ = F−1(
1
2
) (2)
The utility for a voter of a given policy t is given by minus the square of
his actual distance with the policy. Then, the utility of a voter whose ideal
policy is ti is given by the following equation:
u(t) = −(t− ti)2 (3)
This utility definition implies that all voters will prefer the policy which
is closer to their ideal policy.
2.2 The parties
There are two political parties: party L and party R. These parties compete
by oﬀering the policies tL and tR. The citizens vote for the parties according
to these proposals. Thus they indirectly choose the policy. In other words,
the voters’ preferences and the parties’ proposals together determine the
policy to be implemented.
A majority (or Condorcet) winning tax policy is the policy tc that is pre-
ferred by some majority of individuals to any other policy t ∈ [0, 1]. In this
setting, we define by π(tL, tR) the probability that the party L wins when
party L propose tL and party R propose tR. Consequently, the probability
that party R wins will be 1 − π(tL, tR). If the majority of the population
prefers tL to tR then π(tL, tR) = 1. If the majority of the population prefers
tR to tL then π(tL, tR) = 0. If the same number of people vote for tL and
tR, we have π(tL, tR) = 12 ; in this case each party is elected with probability
1
2 .
Since the preferences of the voters are single-peaked, the majority of
the votes will depend on the preferences of the median voter. Thus, the
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probability that the party L wins when party L proposes tL and party R
proposes tR is given by the following equation:
π(tL, tR) =
⎧
⎨
⎩
1 if tL+tR2 > t
∗
1
2 if
tL+tR
2 = t
∗
0 if tL+tR2 < t
∗
(4)
Each party consists of two competing factions, the ‘militants’ and the
‘opportunists’. The opportunists are only willing to maximise the probabil-
ity of their party’s victory. On the other hand, the militants always propose
the party’s ideal point. The factions have divergent interests, we make the
assumption that the policy proposals of each party is the weighted average
of the proposals of the factions. The electoral platforms are therefore deter-
mined according to the party aggregation rule —average proposal— and the
strategic behaviour of the opportunist faction.
3 The policy proposals with given party member-
ship
Political parties can choose among the same set of feasible policies. The
decision within the parties for a policy proposal is the weighted average of
the proposals of the factions. The weight of a faction is the proportion of
its members in the party. The proportion of militants in party i is denoted
by αi where i = L,R. We denote by t
j
i the policy proposals of the militants
and the opportunists in party i where j will stand for O,M . We suppose
that the policy of the party i is as follows:
ti = αitMi + (1− αi)tOi (5)
The militant members propose always the party ideology. For simplicity,
we suppose that the ideologies of the party L and the party R are 0 and 1
respectively.
When we define the utility of the opportunist politicians we have to
consider the political systems since the opportunist politicians are seeking
for the benefits from implementing their policies and the rents from power.
We consider two political systems: the proportional system and the winner-
take-all system. In the former, the rewards that accrue to votes are split
proportionally to the share of votes of each party and the utility of an
opportunist candidate is the share of the votes per candidate. In the latter
the winning party has all the benefits and the utility of an opportunist
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candidate is the probability of winning divided by the number of candidates.
This captures the ideas that the benefits from the elections are equally shared
by all the politicians, or that the politicians have an equal opportunity to
get the benefits.
The party L opportunists maximise π(tL, tR) or F (
tL+tR
2 ) per candi-
date depending on the political system, subject to the constraint tOL ≤ tR.
Consequently, they will propose the highest possible value, namely
tOL = tR. (6)
Likewise, the party R opportunists maximise 1− π(tL, tR) or 1− F ( tL+tR2 )
per candidate depending on the political system subject to the constraint
tOR ≥ tL. They will propose the smallest possible value, namely
tOR = tL. (7)
Solving for tOL = tR and t
O
R = tL in equations (5) will result in a Nash
equilibrium of the game which is a pair of policies (tNL , t
N
R ) such that:
tNL =
(1− αL)αR
1− (1− αL)(1− αR)
(8)
tNR =
αR
1− (1− αL)(1− αR)
(9)
Given our hypothesis on the voters’ preferences, in order to analyse the
probability of victory, we just have to calculate the midpoint of the pair of
policies tN = t
N
L+t
N
R
2 :
tN =
αR(2− αL)
2(1− (1− αL)(1− αR))
(10)
Notice that 0 ≤ tNL ≤ 1, 0 ≤ tNR ≤ 1 and 0 ≤ tN ≤ 1.
3.1 Party composition
By definition, the militants do not update their membership decisions since
they are supposed to derive satisfaction only by being a member of their
party and struggling for the ideology of the party. On the other hand, the
opportunists are supposed to sometimes update their membership decisions
between the elections. Consequently, the set of politicians has three subsets:
the militants of party L, the militants of party R and the opportunists. We
denote by l the number of militants in party L and by r the number of
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militants in party R. The number of the opportunists in the total politician
population is n. The proportion of opportunists in party L is denoted by s.
Thus, the proportion of opportunists in party R is denoted by 1 − s. The
number of opportunists in party L is ns. The number of opportunists in
party R is n(1− s). Without loss of generality, we normalise the number of
politicians to unity (l+ r+ n = 1). We can express the previous values and
results in terms of the new parameters as follows.
The proportion of militants in party L as a function of the share of the
opportunists in party L is:
αL(s) =
l
l + ns
(11)
The proportion of militants in party R as a function of the share of the
opportunists in party L is:
αR(s) =
r
r + n(1− s) (12)
Consequently, the average of the equilibrium pair of policies is given by
the following equation:
tN (s) =
r(2s(1− l − r) + l)
2(l(1− l)(1− s) + sr(1− r)) (13)
Remark. Notice that tN(0) = r2(r+n) ≤
1
2 and
1
2 ≤ tN(1) =
2n+l
2(l+n) ≤ 1. The
first and second derivatives of tN(s) with respect to s are
∂tN(s)
∂s
=
nrl(r + 2n+ l)
2 (lr + n(l(1− s) + sr))2
≥ 0
and ∂
2tN (s)
∂s2 =
n2r(l−r)l(r+2n+l)
(lr+n(l(1−s)+sr))3 ≥ 0 if l ≥ r and
∂2tN (s)
∂s2 =
n2r(l−r)l(r+2n+l)
(lr+n(l(1−s)+sr))3 ≤
0 if l ≤ r so that we have the graph (1) for tN (s) when l ≥ r and s ∈ [0, 1].
Notice also that tN(s) has its minimal value r2(r+n) when s = 0 i.e. when
all the opportunists are in party R and tN (s) has its maximal value 2n+l2(l+n)
when s = 1 i.e. when all the opportunists are in party L.
4 Evolution
4.1 The replicator dynamics
The rationalistic approach to game theory assumes that players are perfectly
rational, the game is played once and the game and the equilibrium are com-
mon knowledge. On the other hand, the evolutionary approach assumes that
9
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Figure 1: The average of the equilibrium pair of policies
boundedly rational players who are randomly drawn from large populations
and who have little or no information about the game, play the game re-
peatedly. Thus, the evolutionary approach allows us to analyse a game
theoretic situation when we relax the perfect information and unbounded
rationality assumptions. The main diﬀerence between these approaches is
that the rationalistic approach analyses the individual behaviour while the
evolutionary approach analyses the population distribution of behaviours
(strategies).
Classically, in Biology, the analysis of population dynamics includes two
processes: the selection process favoring better performing strategies and the
mutation process introducing varieties.
Non-biological interpretations of evolutionary game theory have been
proposed. Borgers and Sarin (1997) and Laslier, Topol and Walliser (2001)
show that models of individual learning by reinforcement can be approxi-
mated by the replicator dynamics. Bjonerstedt and Weibull (1996) show
that the replicator dynamics may be derived from a number of learning
by imitation models, where revising individuals imitate other individuals.
Schlag (1998) shows that the behavioural rule which outperforms the other
improving rules is the one where agents imitate the action of an observed
individual and when each individual imitates the aggregate population be-
haviour is approximated by replicator dynamics.
In this article, we analyse the distribution of behaviours of opportunist
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politicians. They can belong to party L or party R. The utility of being a
candidate of the party L is uL(tL(s), tR(s)). The utility of being a candi-
date of the party R is given by uR(tL(s), tR(s)). The average utility of the
opportunist candidates is
_
u(tL(s), tR(s)).
_
u(tL(s), tR(s)) = suL(tL(s), tR(s)) + (1− s)uR(tL(s), tR(s)) (14)
The selection process determines how population shares corresponding
to diﬀerent pure strategies evolve over time. This process is based on the
survival of the fittest. In other words, the share of the population playing
relatively better performing strategies increases. The selection dynamics
governing change are in continuous time and are regular selection dynam-
ics5. Taylor and Jonker (1978) defined a particular monotonic selection
dynamics called the replicator dynamics. In our model, the replicator dy-
namics diﬀerential equation writes:
.
s = (uL(tL(s), tR(s))−
_
u(tL(s), tR(s)))s (15)
It is clear that better performing strategies have a higher growth rate,
but this does not necessarily imply that the average payoﬀ grows. The reason
is that even if a player is replaced by a player playing a better performing
strategy, this new distribution of players may reduce the payoﬀs of some
other players.
4.2 The evolutionary stability
The replicator dynamics describes how the population shares of candidates
playing diﬀerent strategies change over time. The next step will be to deter-
mine the rest points of the replicator dynamics and analyse their stability
under the assumption that the parties continuously play their instantaneous
5The evolution of the composition of the population is given by a system of continuous-
time diﬀerential equations:
.
s = ξ(s). The function ξ is said to yield a monotonic selection
dynamic if the following conditions are satisfied:
i. ξ is Lipschitz continuous
ii. s = 0⇒ ξ(s) > 0 and s = 1⇒ ξ(s) 6 0
iii. lim
s→0
ξ(s)
s
exists and is finite.
iv. uL(tL(s), tR(s)) > (=) uR(tL(s), tR(s))⇒ ξ(s)s > (=) 0
These conditions ensure that s remains in [0, 1], its growth rates are defined and contin-
uous at all points s ∈ [0, 1] and the growth of the share of the opportunists is proportional
to its relative payoﬀ.
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equilibrium strategies. The utilities of the opportunist candidates are de-
fined following the political system considered. There are two political sys-
tems diﬀering in the way that votes are translated into seats in an assembly:
the proportional system and the winner-take-all system.
4.2.1 The proportional system
In the proportional system, the rents from power are split among the candi-
dates proportionally to their share of the vote. Each party gets seats in the
parliament equal to its vote share. The utility of an opportunist candidate
is the share of the votes per candidate of his party.
Formally, the utility of an opportunist candidate of the party L is:
uL(tL(s), tR(s)) =
1
l + ns
F
µ
tL(s) + tR(s)
2
¶
(16)
and the utility of an opportunist candidate of the party R is:
uR(tL(s), tR(s)) =
1
r + n(1− s)
µ
1− F
µ
tL(s) + tR(s)
2
¶¶
(17)
As we study the rest points of the replicator dynamics when the parties
play their equilibrium strategies, the replicator dynamics will be given by
the following equation:
.
s =
µ
F (tN(s))
l + ns
− 1− F (t
N (s))
r + n(1− s)
¶
s (1− s) (18)
The replicator dynamics has the trivial rest points at s = 0 (the state
where all opportunists are in party R) and s = 1 (the state where all op-
portunists are in party L). The other rest points of the replicator dynamics
are given by the following equation:
F (tN (s∗)) = l + ns∗ (19)
which is the case where the number of votes of the party L is equal to the
share of left party candidates in total candidate population.
Proposition 1 In the proportional system the state where all opportunists
are in party L (s = 1) is stable if F (tN (1)) > l + n. The state where all
opportunists are in party R (s = 0) is stable if F (tN(0)) < l.
The proof is provided in the Appendix.
12
Example 2 The distribution of voters is given by F (x) = x. This is the
case where the population is distributed uniformly along the unit line.
The nontrivial rest points of the replicator dynamics are given by the
following condition:
F (tN(s)) =
2nsr + lr
2 (lr + n(l(1− s) + sr)) = l + ns (20)
When the number of militants of party L and R are equal (l = r), this
equation has the solution s = 12 with no additional assumptions about the
weight of the opportunists in the candidate population. The right hand side
and the left hand side of the equation (20) have been depicted by the graph
(2) for the case n = 0.3. The right hand side is depicted by the dashed line
and the left hand side is depicted by the solid line. We have F (tN(0)) < l.
In this case, since all the opportunist candidates are in party R and the
utility of being a candidate of party L is less than the utility of being a
candidate of party R, s = 0 is stable. Notice that F (tN(1)) > l + n. As all
the opportunists are in party L and the utility of being a candidate of party
L is greater than the utility of being a candidate of party R, s = 1 is stable.
From the previous results, we conclude that s = 12 is not stable.
When the number of militants of the party L and R are diﬀerent (l 6= r),
the equation (20) has at most two solutions. We have also the constraint
s ∈ [0, 1] and the condition r + l < 1 to be satisfied. F (tN (0)) < l if and
only if r < 2l (1− l). In this case, since all the opportunist candidates are in
party R and the utility of being a candidate of party L is less than the utility
of being a candidate of party R, s = 0 is stable. We have F (tN(1)) > l + n
under l < 2r(1−r). As all the opportunists are in party L and the utility of
being a candidate of party L is greater than the utility of being a candidate
of party R, s = 1 is stable. Notice that if we satisfy both conditions there
will be only one solution to the equation (20) since the distribution function
is always increasing in the interval [0, 1] and this solution will not be stable.
The case where s = 0 is the only stable stable i.e. F (tN (0)) < l and
F (tN (1)) < l + n (or r < 2l (1− l) and l > 2r(1 − r)) there will be no
solution to the equation (20). The only stable outcome is the case where
all the opportunists are in party R. The case where only s = 1 is stable i.e.
F (tN (0)) > l and F (tN (1)) > l + n (or r > 2l (1− l) and l < 2r(1 − r))
there will be no solution to the equation (20). The only stable outcome is
the case where all the opportunists are in party L.
Example 3 The distribution of voters is given by F (x) = x(2−x). This is
a case where the population is distributed non-uniformly along the unit line.
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Figure 2: Uniform distribution of voters
Then the nontrivial rest points of the replicator dynamics are given by
the following condition:
F (tN) =
2nsr + lr
2 (lr + n(l(1− s) + sr))(2−
2nsr + lr
2 (lr + n(l(1− s) + sr))) = l + ns
(21)
There are at most three solutions to this equation. When the number of
militants of party L and R are equal (l = r), this equation has no solutions.
We have F (tN(0)) > l. In this case, since all the opportunist candidates are
in party R and the utility of being a candidate of party L is greater than
the utility of being a candidate of party R, s = 0 is not stable. Notice that
F (tN (1)) > l + n. As all the opportunists are in party L and the utility of
being a candidate of party L is greater than the utility of being a candidate
of party R, s = 1 is stable. In case there are equal numbers of militants in
each party, only the situation where the opportunists are all in party L is
stable. This result is due to the fact that the median is closer to the left
party ideology. A symmetric result will apply when we have a nonuniform
distribution with the median closer to the right party ideology. The right
hand side and the left hand side of the equation (21) have been depicted by
the graph (3) for the case n = 0.3. The right hand side is depicted by the
dashed line and the left hand side is depicted by the solid line.
When the number of militants of the party L and R are diﬀerent (l 6= r),
F (tN (0)) < l if and only if r(4(1−l)−r) < 4l(1−l)2 and in this case since all
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Figure 3: Non-uniform distribution of voters
the opportunist candidates are in partyR and the utility of being a candidate
of party L is less than the utility of being a candidate of party R, this point
is stable. F (tN (1)) > l+n if and only if 4r(1−r)2 > l2 the opportunists are
in party L and the utility of being a candidate of party L is greater than the
utility of being a candidate of party R, this point is stable. The existence
and the stability of the other rest points are determined accordingly.
The previous examples are provided to illustrate the relationship between
the distribution of voters, the distribution of politicians and the stability of
the pure states. In politics, the mixed states seem to be more common than
the pure states. Next we provide an example where the mixed state as a
rest point of the replicator dynamics is the only stable outcome.
Example 4 The distribution of voters is given by a beta distribution F (x; v, w) =
1
B(v,w)
R x
0 u
v−1 (1− u)w−1 du. The beta function with parameters v, w is de-
fined by the integral B(v,w) =
R 1
0 u
v−1 (1− u)w−1 du.
The nontrivial rest points of the replicator dynamics are given by the
following condition:
F
¡
tN (s); v, w
¢
=
1
B(v, w)
Z A
0
uv−1 (1− u)w−1 du = l + ns (22)
with
A =
2nsr + lr
2 (lr + n(l(1− s) + sr))
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We will study the case where v = w = 12 . When the number of militants
of party L and R are equal (l = r), this equation has the solution s = 12
with no additional assumptions about the weight of the opportunists in the
candidate population. We have F (tN(0)) > l when r < 0.32. In this case,
since all the opportunist candidates are in party R and the utility of being
a candidate of party L is greater than the utility of being a candidate of
party R, s = 0 is not stable. Notice that F (tN (1)) < l + n when r < 0.32.
As all the opportunists are in party L and the utility of being a candidate
of party L is less than the utility of being a candidate of party R, s = 1 is
not stable. From the previous results, we conclude that s = 12 is stable.
4.2.2 The winner-take-all system
In the winner-take-all system, all the rents from power go to the winner. As
the winning party has all the benefits, the utility of an opportunist candidate
is the probability of winning divided by the number of candidates having
in mind that the benefits from the elections have to be equally shared by
all the politicians or the politicians have and equal opportunity to get the
benefits.
The utility of being a candidate of the party L is uL(tL(s), tR(s)).
uL(tL(s), tR(s)) =
1
l + ns
π(tL(s), tR(s)) (23)
The utility of being a candidate of the partyR is given by uR(tL(s), tR(s)).
uR(tL(s), tR(s)) =
1
r + n(1− s)(1− π(tL(s), tR(s))) (24)
As we study the rest points of the replicator dynamics when the parties
play their equilibrium strategies, the replicator dynamics will be given by
the following equation:
.
s = (
π(tNL (s), t
N
R (s))
l + ns
− π(t
N
L (s), t
N
R (s))
r + n(1− s) )s(1− s) (25)
The replicator dynamics has the trivial rest points at s = 0 and s = 1.
The other rest points of the replicator dynamics are given by the following
equation:
π(tNL (s), t
N
R (s)) = l + ns (26)
where the left hand side is the probability of victory and the right hand side
is the weight of the politicians of the party L in the total population of politi-
cians. When the parties play their equilibrium strategies the probability of
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victory becomes:
π(tNL (s), t
N
R (s)) =
⎧
⎨
⎩
1 if tN (s) > t∗
1
2 if t
N (s) = t∗
0 if tN (s) < t∗
(27)
The graph of the probability of victory as we have defined is not contin-
uous. From the definition of the probability of victory we can conclude that
there may be at most one solution to the equation (26). There are three
cases to analyse:
1. If r2(1−l) ≤ t∗ ≤
1−r+l
2(1−r) , the case where all the opportunists are in the
party L (s = 0) and the case where all the opportunists are in the party
R (s = 1) will both be stable. Let sM be the solution to the equation
(26) then sM must satisfy the following conditions: tN(sM) = t∗ and
l + nsM = 12 . From the previous results, s
M will not be stable.
2. If t∗ < r2(1−l) , t
∗ is always less than tN (s) and π(tNL (s), t
N
R (s)) = 1.
The case where all the opportunists are in the party L (s = 0) is the
only stable state.
3. If t∗ > 1−r+l2(1−r) , t
∗ is always greater than tN(s) and π(tNL (s), t
N
R (s)) = 0.
The case where all the opportunists are in the party R (s = 1) is the
only stable state.
5 Conclusion
This paper studies the evolution of party aﬃliation of opportunist politicians
in diﬀerent political systems. When all the benefits of oﬃce are shared
proportionally to the share of the votes, a situation where the opportunist
politicians are in both parties can be a stable outcome. When all the benefits
go to the winner of the elections, there exist two possible outcomes: all the
opportunists are in the party L or in the party R.
The model may be extended in two ways. The behaviour of policy ori-
ented politicians is based on exogenously given ideologies. The model as
such is not complete. The ideologies of the parties may be endogenised. An-
other extension of the model deals with the behavioural assumption about
the opportunist candidates. The evolutionary dynamics adopted here is con-
sistent with, for instance, the idea that opportunist politicians would decide
about their membership based on random encounters with other opportunist
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politicians in the population. However we also suppose that they can per-
fectly calculate the optimal level of policy to maximise the probability of
winning the elections. This assumption may be relaxed and an adjustment
process may be coupled with the membership decision. Such extensions
could be studied with examples and simulation techniques, but analytical
results would become more complex.
A Appendix
A.1 The two-stage game for the electoral competition
In this section we analyse the model as a two stage game.We consider now
that at the first stage the opportunists review their membership decisions
and at the second stage the party platforms are determined. We can analyse
the case where all the opportunists are in the party L or in the party R.
Note that the following utilities apply at the second stage:
uL(tL(s), tR(s)) =
1
l + ns
F (tN(s))
uR(tL(s), tR(s)) =
1
r + n(1− s)(1− F (t
N(s)))
where tN (s) = 2nsr+lr2(lr+n(l(1−s)+sr)) .
The opportunists will either choose the party L or the party R. As we
would like to see whether the opportunists prefer the party L to party R, we
have to analyse the diﬀerence of the utility of being in party L when they
all choaose party L and the utility of being in party R when they all choose
the party R. Let ∆ = uL(tL(1), tR(1))−uR(tL(0), tR(0)). Then we have the
following results.
∆ =
1
l + n
F (tN(1))− 1
r + n
(1− F (tN (0)))
∆ =
1
(1− r)F
µ
2n+ l
2 (1− r)
¶
+
1
(r + n)
F
µ
r
2(r + n)
¶
− 1
(r + n)
When we draw the previous function for diﬀerent definitions of the dis-
tribution of voters we obtain the following graph (Fig.4) which describes the
region where the utility of being in party L when they all choose party L
is greater than the utility of being in party R when all choose the party R.
The region is defined according to the values of the number of opportunist
politicians and the militants in party R. In the region below the solid line
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in the graph (4), the opportunists will prefer party R when the citizens are
uniformly distributed along the unit line. In the region between the dashed
lines in the graph (4), the opportunists will prefer party L when the citizens
are nonuniformly distributed along the unit line.
When the distribution of voters is uniform and there are equal number of
militants in each party then ∆ = uL(tL(1), tR(1))−uR(tL(0), tR(0)) = 0. In
that case the opportunist politicians will be indiﬀerent between two parties
but as we have analysed in the chapter 3 the case where they are distributed
equally is not a stable outcome.
A.2 Proof of Proposition 1
(Proposition 1) In the proportional system the state where all oppor-
tunists are in party L (s = 1) is stable if F (tN (1)) > l+n. The state where
all opportunists are in party R (s = 0) is stable if F (tN (0)) < l.
To prove the proposition, we need to prove the following lemma.
Lemma Given a population state s and a monotonic selection dynamic
ξ, s is asymptotically stable if (2s−1)(uL(tL(s), tR(s))−uR(tL(s), tR(s))) >
0.
Proof. Let s∗ = 0. If (2s∗−1)(uL(tL(s∗), tR(s∗))−uR(tL(s∗), tR(s∗))) >
0, then uL(tL(s∗), tR(s∗)) > uR(tL(s∗), tR(s∗)). By continuity of payoﬀs in
population share, there exists a neighborhood N of s∗ such that, for all
s ∈ N − s∗, uL(tL(s), tR(s)) < uR(tL(s), tR(s)). If the dynamics ξ(s) are
monotonic, then
.
s < 0. Let L(s) = 1− s. L(s) attains its maximum value
of 1 when s = s∗, and is positive and increasing in N − s∗. This is a
strict Liapunov function for s and s is asymptotically stable by Liapunov’s
Stability Theorem.
Let s∗ = 1. If (2s∗ − 1)(uL(tL(s∗), tR(s∗)) − uR(tL(s∗), tR(s∗))) > 0,
then uL(tL(s∗), tR(s∗)) > uR(tL(s∗), tR(s∗)). By continuity of payoﬀs in
population share, there exists a neighborhood N of s∗ such that, for all
s ∈ N − s∗, uL(tL(s), tR(s)) > uR(tL(s), tR(s)). If the dynamics ξ(s) are
monotonic, then
.
s > 0. Let L(s) = s. L(s) attains its maximum value
of 1 when s = s∗, and is positive and increasing in N − s∗. This is a
strict Liapunov function for s and s is asymptotically stable by Liapunov’s
Stability Theorem.
The lemma simply says that s = 1 is stable if uL(tL(s), tR(s)) > uR(tL(s), tR(s))
and s = 0 is stable if uL(tL(s), tR(s)) < uR(tL(s), tR(s)). The proposition
now may be proved.
Proof of the proposition. For s = 1 to be asymptotically stable we need
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Figure 4: The values of ∆
the following condition:
uL(tL(1), tR(1)) > uR(tL(1), tR(1))
uL(tL(1), tR(1))− uR(tL(1), tR(1)) = 1l+nF (tN(1))−
1
r (1− F (tN (1)))
uL(tL(1), tR(1))− uR(tL(1), tR(1)) = F (t
N (1))−l−n
(l+n)r
F (tN (1))−l−n
(l+n)r > 0⇒ F (tN(1)) > l + n
For s = 0 to be asymptotically stable we need the following condition:
uL(tL(0), tR(0)) < uR(tL(0), tR(0))
uL(tL(0), tR(0))− uR(tL(0), tR(0)) =
1
l
F (tN(0))− 1
r + n
(1− F (tN (0)))
uL(tL(0), tR(0))− uR(tL(0), tR(0)) =
F (tN (1))− l
(r + n)l
F (tN (0))− l
(r + n)l
> 0⇒ F (tN(0)) > l.
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